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Abstract
“Justice and fairness” has become something of a mantra ever since presidential candidate Barack Obama told
Joe the plumber that his hope was to “spread the wealth around” so that the economy is “good for everybody.”
The plumber, Samuel Wurzelbacher, was less than thrilled by the implications of spreading the wealth, since
his fear was that much of the wealth the president-to-be proposed to spread around was the plumber’s. But
that has done nothing to give pause to President Obama’s determination to answer the “call to justice and
fairness.” In his 2009 Lincoln’s Birthday speech in Abraham Lincoln’s hometown of Springfield, Illinois, the
president described justice and fairness—the “sense of shared sacrifice and responsibility for ourselves and
one another”—as “the very definition of being American.” [excerpt]
Keywords
Abraham Lincoln, Civil War, Hadley Arkes
Disciplines
History | Political History | United States History
This book chapter is available at The Cupola: Scholarship at Gettysburg College: https://cupola.gettysburg.edu/cwfac/19
C h a p t e r 2 : 
L i n c o l n a n d J u s t i c e f o r A l l 
A l l e n C . G u e l z o 
Justice is the concern of everyone, but the property of no one, at least 
humanly speaking. It is, fundamentally, a relationship - of people to 
each other, of parts to a whole, of balance between people and parts - in 
which the two great goals in view are that of satisfaction and that of har-
mony. In a putatively just world, people are satisfied with what they have 
(either by use or possession or both), what they do (in terms of love and 
work), and where they are (both as physical location and where they per-
ceive themselves in relation to other people's social and economic stand-
ing). But satisfaction is not the whole story; it is, after all, possible to be 
satisfied and at the same time disgruntled, if we feel that our satisfac-
tions are simply compromises with a reality we do not otherwise 
applaud. Nor is satisfaction permanent - what satisfies at one point in 
the life of an individual or a society may pale and disintegrate at anoth-
er. What is required for justice is, alongside satisfaction, harmony. It is 
a kind of universal aesthetic, a species of beauty and complacency 
whose ultimate location is in the being of God. We must have the sense 
that the arrangements of justice are not only satisfactory for ourselves, 
but satisfactory to us in what is granted to, or achieved by, others. Our 
own satisfactions may mean little if we perceive that others' satisfactions 
are promoted beyond our own, and we will soon begin to regard as 
unjust the arrangements which allowed this to happen; at that moment, 
we will begin to agitate for some kind of redress, and there will go har-
mony out the window. Or, we will begin to fear that, if others' satisfac-
tions have been discounted to a level lower than our own, these "others" 
will one day take some action to reverse the situation, such as robbery 
or revolution. The first victim of this fear, likewise, is harmony. 
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Unhappily for any political order, both satisfaction and harmony 
have subjective and objective aspects. The wealthy miser may be tor-
mented by the anxiety for acquiring more wealth, and his perception 
that his increasing wealth is being threatened by some external force 
leads him into suspicion and litigation, leaving him with neither satis-
faction nor harmony, but an abiding sense of the injustice of things. The 
operator of the village smithy, on the other hand, whose 
. . . brow is wet with honest sweat, 
He earns whate'er he can, 
And looks the whole world in the face, 
For he owes not any man. . . .' 
may be blithely content with his "flaming forge"-and his daily routine 
of "something attempted, something done," and this gives him his 
"night's repose" - irrespective of the greater engines of finance, acqui-
sition and consumption all around him which have been fleecing the 
blacksmith (and his kind) of the true value of their labor. The miser 
looks at his own over-compensated life, and calls it injustice; the black-
smith looks at his under-compensated one, and enjoys both satisfaction 
and harmony. And above them both floats the philosopher, who tells 
them, alternately: 
(a) that the world (or the nation, or the society, or the neighbor 
hood) is a conspiracy to defraud which he and the miser have both 
rightly descried; 
(b) that the world (and so forth) is a conspiracy to defraud whichever 
one of them is too stupid and blinded by hegemonic false-con-
sciousness to perceive without the epiphany of revolutionary self-
consciousness, or 
(c) that the world (yet again) is a conspiracy to defraud about which 
nothing can really be done, but the denunciation of which the 
philosopher can use as a means of achieving his own version of sat-
isfaction and harmony, preferably as the occupant* of an endowed 
chair in political or economic theory. 
1 Henry Wadswor'th Longfellow, "The Village Blacksmith," in Ballads and Other 
Poems (Cambridge, MA: John Owen, 1841), 100. 
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With such subjectivity standing like a veil between justice and the 
experience of injustice, we might well consign all hope of recognizing 
justice to the same category as that other famous item which we can't 
define, but which we know when we see it. 
But only if we ourselves are also philosophers. There are at least 
two practical ways of cutting the subjective knot and confecting a uni-
versal solution to this dilemma of what makes for justice. One is by 
power. We may erect a structural standard of justice, without any par-
ticular regard for anything inherently consistent, limiting or painful 
about its parts or its application, and compel a submission to this stan-
dard so overwhelming that there will be no choice but to find in it sat-
isfaction and harmony. This is the justice of the straitjacket, in which 
dissatisfaction is regarded as a trait of mental illness and dissonance as 
a crime. It requires endless labor, because it is entirely reactive in 
nature, but no work, because everyone is satisfied and everything is in 
harmony. In this environment, injustice eventually becomes impossi-
ble because it has been definitionally abolished. Ordinarily, given the 
fissiparousnature of human behavior, this might not strike us as very 
"practical," but in fact, modern technology (not to mention pharmacol-
ogy) is making it more achievable, and our lives less human, day-by-
day. 
The other method is by law: we may create a functional standard of 
justice which requires only logical adherence, and then walk away, 
resorting only to power for the deployment and enforcement of the legal 
code. A society cannot dispense entirely with power in its government; 
otherwise, law becomes shredded by those who worship mere power. 
Let the law and its officers operate, and in a predictable and routine pat-
tern, and let what results from that operation be deemed harmony. In 
that way, even the worst examples of law-codes produce more harmo-
ny than does mere power. The fundamental problem is that law fre-
quently falls far short' of granting satisfaction. Of course, one out of 
two ain't bad; and sometimes and in some societies, you do succeed in 
getting both. Unhappily, law also depends for its application on that 
same fissiparous human nature, to the point where law can become 
merely a mask for power. One can get Cincinnatus, using an emergency 
donation of power to restore law; or one can get Caesar, using an 
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emergency donation of power to destroy it. At that moment, vexed and 
righteous souls become convinced that law is a crook, and that they 
need to invoke power in order to provide satisfaction and harmony. 
True, there has been more than enough evil done by power; but power, 
some believe, can be de-fanged if it is exercised on behalf offairness, 
an even more subjective precept which suggests that power, in the right 
hands, can work miracles of justice which law cannot. 
There is a third way, which is not a solution, but rather an intellec-
tual palliative, and that is anarchy, which fears power, and yet also nurs-
es deep suspicions of law. But anarchy (and its milder, libertarian 
forms) only has the appearance of justice - it secures only the immedi-
ate satisfaction of having no restraint, and the immediate harmony of 
having no one but yourself to enjoy it with. After the first 24 hours, or 
the first 24 visitors with semi-automatic weapons, either power or law 
get called into service, simply in the interest of taking a secure breath 
- or any breath at all. 
This, in less than a thousand words, is the history of thought about 
justice. Thrasymachus (in Plato's Republic), Calhoun, Marx and 
Hobbes believed that justice was the operation of power, and lived 
entirely within history. They were suspicious. Locke, J.S. Mill and 
Hayek believed, it was the operation of law, based on an overarching 
natural law which was eternal. They were earnest. As for American 
thinkers, power has held more attraction than we might imagine, espe-
cially when its aim can be designated as "fairness" and its harmony 
identified with "disinterested benevolence" or "the Beloved 
Community" But Americans have always been people of two souls, one 
the soul of the Puritan and the other the soul of the Enlightenment, at 
once both suspicious and earnest. Speaking for law and the 
Enlightenment and the containment of power were the Founders of the 
Republic, and the "second founder" who saved it from self-destruction, 
Abraham Lincoln. 
Abraham Lincoln certainly had more than a little to say about jus-
tice. Frequently, he used the word to mean something like a rough-and-
ready tit-for-tat. In dealing out political patronage, he promised Lyman 
Trumbull, his fellow Illinois Republican, that "I will, myself, take care 
of the question of 'corrupt jobs' and see that justice is done to all, our 
4 0 SECOND LOOK AT FIRST THINGS 
friends, of whom you write, as well as others."2 In hailing the Union 
victory at the battle of Antietam in 1862, he praised how "bravely, skill-
fully and successfully fought the battle had been," but because he did 
not yet "know the particulars," he wanted to be "sure that in giving 
praise to particular individuals, we do no injustice to others."3 And a 
few weeks later, he had to assure the laggardly Major-General George 
B. McClellan that "I intend no injustice to any" for sarcastically query-
ing why McClellan's "cavalry horses were too much fatigued to move." 
McClellan's inertia "presented a very cheerless, almost hopeless, 
prospect for the future; and it may have forced something of impatience 
into my despatches."4 Justice, in this petit sense, was about decorum, 
politeness, and giving newsworthy credit to the nation's servants. 
Sometimes, however, the tit-for-tat could rise to something more 
than the rough-and-ready. Massachusetts Congressman John B. Alley 
remembered presenting Lincoln with a petition from his district to par-
don the master of a "vessel engaged in the slave- trade" who had 
"served out his term of imprisonment, but could not pay his fine." The 
prisoner added his own "urgent and pathetic appea l , . . . acknowledging 
the crime and the justice of the sentence, and declaring that he must 
spend his life in prison if the condition of freedom was the payment of 
that fine, for he had not a cent in the world." Lincoln read the docu-
ments over, and pushed them back at Alley. "I believe I am kindly 
enough in nature . . . to pardon the perpetrator of almost the worst 
creme that the mind of man can conceive," Lincoln said, "but any man 
. . . who can rob Africa of her children to sell into interminable 
bondage, I never will pardon, and he may stay and rot in jail before he 
will get relief from me."5 
But justice could also mean a more universal, all-embracing bal-
ancing of what was right and what was wrong. The presidential action 
2 "To Lyman Trumbull" (December 8, 1860), in Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler et al (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 
4:148. 
3 "Reply to Serenade in Honor of Emancipation Proclamation" (September 24, 
1862), in C.WT, 5:438. 
4 "To George B. McClellan" (October 27, 1862), in C.W., 5:479. 
5 John B. Alley, in Rice, Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln, 583. 
Lincoln and Justice for All 41 
he deemed "the central act of my administration and the great event 
of the nineteenth century" - namely, the Emancipation Proclamation 
of January 1, 1863 - was declared by him to be "an act of justice" on 
whibch he confidently invoked "the considerate judgment of 
mankind, and the gracious favor of Almighty God."6 He aggressively 
defended the use of military tribunals and suspending the writ of 
habeas corpus as legitimate acts of justice because the ordinary civil 
courts were unequal to the tasks presented by full-scale insurrection 
and sedition: 
Nothing is better known to history than that courts of justice are 
utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil courts are organized 
chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at most, a few individuals act-
ing in concert; and this in quiet times, and on charges of crimes 
well defined in the law. Even in times of peace, bands of horse-
thieves and robbers frequently grow too numerous and powerful 
for the ordinary courts of justice. But what comparison, in num-
bers, have such bands ever borne to the insurgent sympathizers 
even in* many of the loyal states? 
In time of peace, interference with political dissent would be an injus-
tice; in time of war, not to interfere with political dissent would be 
treachery. "He who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces 
one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills 
a union soldier in battle. Yet this dissuasion, or inducement, may be so 
conducted as to be no defined crime of which any civil court would 
take cognizance." Lincoln would be obligated under military law to 
"shoot a simple-minded soliderboy who deserts," while the civil courts 
insist "I must not touch a hair of a wiley aligator who induces him to 
desert." In the time of war, he asked, was this justice?7 
Questions about the varying levels of justice came readily to Lincoln 
because he was, after all, a lawyer by profession, so that determining the 
justice or injustice of human affairs was a daily responsibility. "My way 
6 Francis B. Carpenter, Six Months at the White House with Abraham Lincoln: The 
Story of a Picture (New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1867), 90; "Emancipation 
Proclamation" (January 1, 1863), in C. W„ 6:30. 
7 "To Erastus Corning and Others" (June 12, 1863), in C. W., 6:264. 
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of living leads me to be about the courts of justice," he said in 1848, 
although he admitted that not everything he saw there actually lived up to 
the name of justice. "There, I have sometimes seen a good lawyer, strug-
gling for his client's neck, in a desperate case, employing every artifice 
to work round, befog, and cover up, with many words, some point arising 
in the case, which he dared not admit, and yet could not deny."8 Lincoln 
was also, by avocation, a politician, and there, too, he had more than a 
few opportunities to see the making of laws fall far short of the glory of 
justice. In the proceedings of legislatures (and Lincoln sat in the Illinois 
state legislature from 1834 to 1842, so he spoke with authority), it "was 
too often the case that "the immutable principles of justice are to make 
way for party interests, and the bonds of social order are to be rent in 
twain, in order that a desperate faction may be sustained at the expense 
of the people."9 
In 1841, Illinois Democrats tried to ram a restructuring of the state 
judiciary through the state Assembly. Lincoln found the intention of the 
restructuring so nakedly self-serving (and so little interested in the 
establishment of justice) that even members of the Democratic caucus 
rebelled against stacking "the temples of justice and the seats of inde-
pendent judges" with "the tools of faction." Lincoln saw this for what 
it was, even on that comparatively small-scale stage — the substitution 
of power for law. The pursuit of justice was being swept aside to make 
way for "an arbitrary exercise of power which may soon become the 
precedent for still more flagrant violations of right and justice." The 
most "baneful and miserable . . . tendencies of this measure," however, 
would be the way the taint of power, exercised in one branch of govern-
ment, would soon infect them all. Politically stacked courts were polit-
ically predictable courts, where verdicts were obtained first and evi-
dence mustered later, so that nothing they decided could really be trust-
ed to be just. Without the restraint of the courts, the legislature would 
feel free to open the floodgates to self-interest, corruption, and a lethal 
fog of cynicism which would spread over all of the body politic, "since 
8 "Speech in United States House of Representatives: The War with Mexico" 
(January 12, 1848), in C.W., 1:438. 
9 "Circular from Whig Committee Against the Judiciary Bill" (February [8?], 
1841), inC. W., 1:246. 
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our courts, if not corrupt, must be suspected, and the streams of justice 
tinged, if not by the impurity of the fountain, by the jaundiced vision of 
the beholder."10 
But the ultimate threat posed to the health of a democracy by the 
"jaundice" of power was not merely a lapsing into indifference 
(although in a democracy, where sovereignty lay in the hands of the 
people, popular cynicism and indifference certainly promised a slow 
erosion of the vigor necessary to sustain it). Where power replaced the 
operation of justice, then the victimized would themselves resort to 
power in self-defense (or self-justification), and the operation of a 
democracy would all-too-rapidfy degenerate into the violence and anar-
chy of armed mobs. "I hope I am over wary," he warned in 1838, after 
a series of high-profile mob actions in the towns of the upper 
Mississippi valley, but it was no sign of robust health in a democracy 
whenever the vicious portion of population shall be permitted to 
gather in bands of hundreds and thousands, and burn churches, 
ravage and rob provision stores, throw printing presses into rivers, 
shoot editors, and hang and burn obnoxious persons at pleasure, 
and with impunity. 
"Depend on it," Lincoln predicted: when power supplants law, "this 
Government cannot last." When a popular government shows that it is 
incapable of governing itself by law, and "in lieu of the sober judgement 
of Courts" allows "worse than savage mobs" to function as "the execu-
tive ministers of justice," then "the feelings of the best citizens will 
become more or less alienated from it; and thus it will be left without 
friends, or with too few, and those few too weak, to make their friend-
ship effectual." It has the effect of a fall of dominoes: let the rulers gov-
ern themselves by self-interest rather than law, then do not be surprised 
when the people in the streets decide to do the same thing, whether as 
vigilantes or as rioters. And do not be surprised, either, that "the best 
citizens," recoiling from the unrestrained tumult in the streets, turn their 
backs on popular government itself and turn to "men of sufficient tal-
ent and ambition" who will be happy to restore order through their own 
10 Ibid, 1:236,247. 
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exercise of power, "and overturn that fair fabric, which for the last half 
century, has been the fondest hope, of the lovers of freedom, through-
out the world." Law, in effect, became a religion for Lincoln. 
Let reverence for the laws, be breathed by every American moth-
er, to the lisping babe, that prattles on her lap - let it be taught in 
schools, in seminaries, and in colleges; - let it be written in 
Primmers, spelling books, and in Almanacs; - let it be preached 
from the pulpit, proclaimed in legislative halls, and enforced in 
courts of justice. And, in short, let it become the political religion 
of the nation; and let the old and the young, the rich and the poor, 
the grave and the gay, of all sexes and tongues, and colors and con-
ditions, sacrifice unceasingly upon its altars.11 
For all of his anxieties about the allure of power, Lincoln never lost his 
faith in either law or politics to light the way to justice. John P. Usher, 
who sat in Lincoln's cabinet as Secretary of the Interior, believed that 
"Mr. Lincoln's greatness was founded upon his devotion to truth, his 
humanity and his innate sense of justice to all."12 He had little in the way 
of religious faith apart from what looked to most observers like a form of 
secularized Calvinism; but like many of the Founders, Lincoln made up 
for this loss with an intensified commitment to natural honor and obliga-
tion. Joseph Gillespie, his longtime political ally in Illinois, thought that 
"Mr. Lincoln's love of justice & fair play was his predominating trait." 
This was especially true inside the courtroom, where it was no legend 
that Lincoln was nearly incapable of defending a position he was con-
vinced was not just. "It was not in his nature to assume or attempt to bol-
ster up a false position. He would abandon his case first," Gillespie wrote 
in 1866; in fact, Gillespie had "often listened to him when I thought he 
would certainly state his case out of court." Judge David Davis, who 
presided over Lincoln's old 8th Judicial Circuit in Illinois, recalled that 
Lincoln "thought that his duty to his client Extended to what was honor-
able and high minded - jus t and noble - nothing further." He was no more 
11 "Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois" (January 27, 
1838), inC.W, 1:109. 
12 J.P. Usher, "Lincoln and Slavery," in Rice, Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln, 77. 
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likely to attempt lawyerly sleights-of-hand o"n his opponents, either. 
Judge Davis said that "the meanest man in the bar would always pay great 
deference & respect to Lincoln" because "he never took advantage of a 
man's low character to prejudice the Jury."13 
This pursuit of legal rectitude won Lincoln widespread respect, but 
not necessarily widespread affection, especially among friends and 
clients who wanted to win in either law or politics - and expected him 
to resort to any tricks available to do so ^ rather than merely to be right. 
Being right, as Gillespie remarked, meant that Lincoln "was by some 
considered cold hearted or at least indifferent towards his friends" 
because he "He would rather disoblige a friend than do an act of injus-
tice to a political opponent."14 The ordinary lawyer, observed another 
long-time legal associate on the 8th Circuit, Henry Clay Whitney, 
would allow "the current of details and exigencies" to "jostle" him one 
way or the other, but Lincoln "stood upright through all contingencies, 
and nothing could swerve him from the observance of rigid, exact, 
unerring justice." This did not mean that Lincoln believed he possessed 
some godlike perception of justice in all circumstances and all cases, 
and "of course," added Whitney, "if there was a margin for doubt, he 
used the usual advantages incident to his side as any other lawyer 
would."15 But in what Whitney called "conclusive cases," Lincoln 
seemed almost morally unable to make dark appear light. "The main 
question with Mr. Lincoln was: Ts the thing right, is it just? '" remem-
bered Lincoln's law partner of 14 years, William Henry Herndon. 
If a man was the subject of his attention, the question which he put 
to himself was: "What great truth, what principle, do you represent 
in this world?" If the thing was just, he approved of it, and if the 
man was a sham, he said: "Begone." He was a man of great moral 
13 Joseph Gillespie to William H. Herndon (January 31, 1866) and David Davis 
(September 20, 1866), in Herndon's Informants: Letters, Interviews and 
Statements About Abraham Lincoln, eds. R.O. Davis and D.L. Wilson (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1998), 182, 351. 
14 Joseph Gillespie to William H. Herndon (December 8, 1866), in Herndon's 
Informants, 507. 
15 Whitney, Life on the Circuit with Lincoln, ed. Paul Angle (Caldwell, ID: Caxton 
Printers, 1940), 240. 
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and physical courage and had the valor and bravery of his convic-
tions and dared cautiously to do what he thought was right and 
just.16 
And when Lincoln was convinced of the justice of a plea or a policy, 
that conviction animated him as nothing else would., "I will say here 
that, in such moments, I have never heard his equal," recalled Horace 
White, who accompanied Lincoln around Illinois during Lincoln's 
debates with Stephen A. Douglas in 1858 as a cub reporter for the 
Chicago Tribune. "I believe I have listened at times to nearly all the 
public speakers of considerable reputation in this country," but "I can-
not conceive that Patrick Henry, Mirabeau, or Vergniaud ever surpassed 
him on those occasions when his great soul was inspired with the 
thought of human rights and Divine justice."17 Anyone who met 
Lincoln casually was likely to see only a homely-looking country 
lawyer whose "flesh was dark, wrinkled, and folded . . . dry and leath-
ery, tough and everlasting," with a "head small and forehead receding." 
But, interposed Herndon, "when this great man was moved by some 
great or good feeling - by some idea of liberty or justice or right," then 
Lincoln was transformed. The eyes brightened, the stature straightened, 
and the arms were flung energetically upward, and "then he seemed an 
inspired man."18 
The standard of justice to which Lincoln held the world began with 
recognizing the existence of a fundamental natural law. Like many of 
the liberal political theorists of the nineteenth century, Lincoln was 
tempted to endorse a variety of utilitarian nostrums about law, starting 
with Jeremy Bentham's dictum that law should be guided by the princi-
ple of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number."19 So, for 
Lincoln, our "duty to . . . assist in ameliorating mankind" inclined him, 
16 Herndon to C. O. Poole (January 5, 1886), in Emmanuel Hertz, ed., The Hidden 
Lincoln From the Letters and Papers of William H. Herndon (New York: Viking, 
1938), 121. 
17 Horace White to William H. Herndon (May 17, 1865), in Herndon's Informants, 
4. 
18 Herndon (June 24, 1887), in Hertz, The Hidden Lincoln, 185. 
19 On the "greatest happiness" formula, see Bentham, Deontology together with A 
Table of the Springs of Moral Action, ed. Amnon Goldworth (Oxford, 1983), 60. 
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"without entering upon the details of the question," to "simply say, that 
I am for those means which will give the greatest good to the greatest 
number."20 One reason he could not endorse the Bible without reserva-
tion was, as he told Isaac Cogdal in 1860, that he "could not believe in 
the endless punishment of anyone of the human race" because this 
made justice operate in a retributive fashion, whereas he preferred to 
think, like Bentham, that "punishment was parental in its object, aim, 
and design, and intended for the good of the offender; hence it must 
cease when justice is satisfied."21 Had he wanted to be a consistent 
Benthamite, he might have joined Bentham in dismissing any connec-
tion between statutory law-codes and natural law as "nonsense on 
stilts." And Lincoln actually advised one young lawyer to train himself 
to "listen well to all the evidence" and "Hear the lawyers make their 
argument as patiently as you can." But after that, 
stripping yourself of all prejudice, if any you have, and throwing 
away, if you can, all technical law knowledge . . . then stop one 
moment and ask yourself: what is justice in this case, and let that 
sense of justice be your decision. Law is nothing else but the best 
reason of wise men applied for ages to the transactions and busi-
ness of mankind.22 
But Lincoln was not a theorist or a philosopher, and liberal democrats 
in the nineteenth century were far from unanimous in embracing 
Bentham's rejection of natural law, and when Lincoln came to confront 
the issue of slavery in both law and politics, he fell back almost at once 
on an appeal to natural law. 
Lincoln described his aversion to slavery as virtually an instinct, a 
natural moral default. "I am naturally anti-slavery. If slavery is not 
wrong, nothing is wrong. I can not remember when I did not so think, 
and feel."23 This was not just Romantic sentimentality. There were 
20 "Speech to Germans at Cincinnati, Ohio" (February 12, 1861), in C.W., 4:202. 
21 Cogdal, in Don and Virginia Fehrenbacher, eds., Recollected Words of Abraham 
Lincoln (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996), 110; William Lee Miller, 
Lincoln's Virtues: An Ethical Biography (New York: Knopf, 2002), 87. 
22 Herndon, in Fehrenbacher, Recollected Words of Abraham Lincoln, 243. 
23 "To Albert G. Hodges" (April 4, 1864), in C. W, 7:281. 
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certain "immutable principles of justice" grafted onto nature, and 
among these were the natural rights enumerated by Thomas Jefferson 
in the Declaration of Independence (to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness") and found in the universal behavior of all creatures. 
Slavery clashed inharmoniously with all of them. "All feel and under-
stand it, even down to brutes and creeping insects." At its root, slavery 
was nothing more than "the same old serpent that says you work and I 
eat, you toil and I will enjoy the fruits of it."24 That much, even the ant 
recoiled from. An "ant, who has toiled and dragged a crumb to his nest, 
will furiously defend the fruit of his labor, against whatever robber 
assails him," and by the same token, even "the most dumb and stupid 
slave that ever toiled for a master, does constantly know that he is 
wronged."25 Lincoln's own experience was to feel an automatic revul-
sion against anyone who tried to steal from others the fruit of their' 
labor. "My faith in the proposition that each man should do precisely as 
he pleases with all which is exclusively his own, lies at the foundation 
of the sense of justice there is in me." And in their heart of hearts, slave-
holders knew that this was a natural axiom of justice: "Your sense of 
justice, and human sympathy" is "continually telling you, that the poor 
negro has some natural right to himself - that those who deny it, and 
make mere merchandise of him, deserve kickings, contempt and 
death." What trampled across this inherent sense of the injustice of 
slavery was nothing but self-interest, which had to be summoned-up in 
order to "repress all tendencies in the human heart to justice and 
mercy" on the part of slaveholders.26 "Slavery is founded in the selfish-
ness of man's nature - opposition to it, in his love of justice," and when 
these are "brought into collision so fiercely, as slavery extension brings 
them, shocks, and throes, and convulsions must ceaselessly follow."27 
The besetting problem for Lincoln and his generation was that slav-
ery was also founded in statute law. The majority of states in the Union 
at the time of the Constitution legalized chattel slavery, and even those 
which subsequently emancipated their slaves still provided for the ren-
24 "Speech at Chicago, Illinois" (July 10, 1858), in C. W„ 2:500. 
25 "Fragment on Slavery" [July 1, 1854?], in C. W., 2:222. 
26 "Speech at Carlinville, Illinois" (August 31, 1858), 3:80. 
27 "Speech at Peoria, Illinois" (October 16, 1854), in C. W, 2:265, 271. 
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dition of fugitive slaves by state law, as well as by the requirement of 
Article IV, section three of the federal Constitution, and the federal 
fugitive slave laws of 1793 and 1850. In the face of slavery's protec-
tions under federal and state law, the response of slavery's most radical 
opponents was to dismiss the standing of law as a mere disguise for 
Southern political power, and to offset "the Slave Power" with the 
power of non-compliance and even outright law-breaking. Ralph Waldo 
Emerson saw, like Lincoln, that slavery was based on "the love of 
power, the voluptuousness of holding a human being in . . . absolute 
control." But his solution in 1851 was to disobey the Fugitive Slave 
Law of 1850: "This filthy enactment was made in the nineteenth cen-
tury, by people who could read and write. I will not obey it by God."28 
The abolitionist minister, Owen Lovejoy, who represented one of 
Illinois' seven Congressional districts, roared his defiance of the 
Fugitive Slave Law in 1859 on the floor of the House of 
Representatives: "Owen Lovejoy lives at Princeton, Illinois, three-quar-
ters of a mile east of the village, and he aids every fugitive that comes 
to his door and asks it. Proclaim it then from the housetops. Write it on 
every leaf that trembles in the forest, make it blaze from the sun at high 
noon."29 
Emerson, Lovejoy, and every other abolitionist worth reckoning 
believed that they could appeal directly to divine or natural law, and use 
that sanction to shoulder aside the inequities and half-truths of human 
statute. In principle, Lincoln did not disagree that there was a "higher 
law" than statute law, and that it flatly obliterated any argument in favor 
of slavery. The Declaration of Independence, and its enunciation of a 
universal equality based on the natural rights of life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness was a "majestic interpretation of the economy of the 
Universe," filled with a "lofty, and wise, and noble understanding of the 
justice of the Creator to His creatures" in "nothing stamped with the 
Divine image and likeness was sent into the world to be trodden on, and 
28 Robert D. Richardson, Emerson: The Mind on Fire (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), 397, 498. 
29 Lovejoy, "Speech on the Fanaticism of the Democratic Party" (February 21,1859), 
in His Brother's Blood: Owen Lovejoy, Speeches and Writings, 1838-1864, ed. 
William F. & Jane Ann Moore (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004), 178. 
5 0 SECOND LOOK AT FIRST THINGS 
degraded, and imbruted by its fellows."30 But he also understood that 
evil, in the process of being humanly institutionalized, wraps up with 
itself bits and percentages of good, which it would be fool's wisdom to 
destroy along with the evil in one righteous smash. "The true rule, in 
determining to embrace, or reject any thing, is not whether it have any 
evil in it; but whether it have more of evil, than of good," Lincoln said 
in Congress in 1848. "There are few things wholly evil, or wholly good. 
Almost everything, especially of governmental policy, is an inseparable 
compound of the two; so that our best judgment of the preponderance 
between them is continually demanded."31 Lincoln could not believe 
that there was no pathway around the shortcomings of human institu-
tions but that of anarchy and power. It mortified him that the Taney 
Court could breeze so cheerfully past both natural law and the'will of 
the people, as it did in Dred Scott v. Sanford in 1857. Still, the solution 
was not defiance, but "obedience to, and respect for, the judicial 
department of government," because even a mistaken Court is better 
than no Court at all: 
We think its decisions on Constitutional questions, when fully 
settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided, but 
the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by 
amendments of the Constitution as provided in that instrument 
itself. More than this would be revolution. But we think the Dred 
Scott decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it, has 
often over-ruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to 
have it to over-rule this. We offer no resistance to it.32 
There was no foreshadowing of Gandhian civil disobedience in 
Lincoln, if only because disobedience of any sort, for whatever noble 
motive, acted like dry-rot on the rule of law, and eventually persuaded 
people that the restraints of law are the enemy, rather than the basis of 
human freedom. 
"The injustice of men" is not righted by compensatory displays of 
30 "Speech at Lewistown, Illinois" (August 17, 1858), in C.W, 2:246-247. 
31 "Speech in United States House of Representatives on Internal Improvements" 
(June 20, 1848), in C.W., 1:484. 
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well-intentioned power, judicial, legislative or executive, but by faithful 
adherence to the rule of law, which included both statutes and the 
mechanisms for altering statutes. It is only within the framework and 
expectations of the rule of law that power can be deployed with enough 
certainty to relax. In his first public protest against slavery, registered 
in 1837 in the Illinois legislature, Lincoln announced that "the institu-
tion of slavery is founded on both injustice and bad policy." But by 
challenging the law, "the promulgation of abolition doctrines tends 
rather to increase than to abate its evils." When a mob lynched some 
riverboat gamblers in Vicksburg in 1837, Lincoln thought that "Its 
direct consequences are, comparatively speaking, but a small evil," 
since the community as a whole was going to shed few tears over the 
reduction of the gaming population. But what it tended toward was the 
suggestion that power was the only effective antidote to evil. "By 
instances of the perpetrators of such acts going unpunished, the lawless 
in spirit, are encouraged to become lawless in practice; and having been 
used to no restraint, but dread of punishment, they thus become, 
absolutely unrestrained." Slavery, likewise, was an evil , but the resort 
to power to disrupt its operation reduced the moral authority of its 
opponents to the same level as the slaveholders and, in the case of fugi-
tive slaves, the slave hunters.33 Much as the abolitionists insisted that 
they had a mandate which relieved them of any responsibility for the 
consequences of public disobedience, Lincoln shot back that the claim 
that they would "do their duty and leave the consequences to God," 
merely gave an excuse for taking a course that they were not able 
to maintain by a fair and full argument. To make this declaration 
did not show what their duty was. If it did we should have no use 
for judgment, we might as well be made without intellect, and 
when divine or human law does not clearly point out what is our 
duty, we have no means of finding out what it is by using our most 
intelligent judgment of the consequences. 
32 "Speech at Springfield, Illinois" (June 26, 1857), in C.W, 2:401. 
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He did not dispute, any more than the abolitionists, that "slavery was an 
evil," but given the fact that slavery was a state enactment, until those 
state legislatures where slavery was legal chose to abolish it or to eman-
cipate their slaves in some gradual fashion, "we . . . cannot affect it in 
States of this Union where we do not live." That was simply in the 
nature of a federal Constitution which strictly divided the jurisdictions 
of the state and the national government. Of course, if the question was 
not about slavery in the states, but whether slavery should be legalized 
in the western territories, this would be another matter, because 
Congress had direct jurisdiction over the organization of the territories 
and their preparation for statehood, and could take legislative action 
there concerning slavery which it could not take in the states. "The 
question of the extension of slavery to new territories of this country, is 
a part of our responsibility and care, and is under our control."34 
For whatever purpose the abolitionists thought government was 
intended, Lincoln did not believe that it was intended for the purpose of 
righting all wrongs, at all times, by all means. "The legitimate object of 
government is to do for the people what needs to be done, but which 
they can not, by individual effort, do at all, or do so well, for them-
selves." This included matters which had little or nothing to do with jus-
tice and "exist independently of the injustice in the world" - for 
instance, the "Making and maintaining roads, bridges, and the like; pro-
viding for the helpless young and afflicted; common schools; and dis-
posing of deceased men's property." There were two places the govern-
ment did have a clear and unambiguous responsibility to address injus-
tice. One was in national self-defense against the outrages and aggres-
sions of warlike powers. "If one people will make war upon another, it 
is a necessity with that other to unite and cooperate for defense. Hence 
the military department." The other situation in which government 
brought its attention to bear on injustice was when "some men will kill, 
or beat, or constrain others, or despoil them of property, by force, fraud, 
or noncompliance with contracts, it is a common object with peaceful 
and just men to prevent it. Hence the criminal and civil departments." 
34 "Speech at Worcester, Massachusetts" (September 12, 1848), in C.W, 2:2; Miller, 
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The bulk of Lincoln's legal practice was civil in nature, and it is useful 
to remember that this is what he deemed a concern of justice: the 
largest component of his practice was property disputes, and fully half 
of the 3,400 cases he and Herndon handled between 1844 and 1861 
involved debt collections.35 A debt collector is not often thought of as 
an agent of justice. But Lincoln was by no means a legal Robin Hood: 
he wrote opinions for the Illinois Central Railroad on the dispossession 
of squatter and pre-emption rights to land the railroad claimed, and 
defended the Illinois Central in tax-exemption suits. Olivier Fraysse, 
commenting on Lincoln's record as a lawyer and a politician on prop-
erty-ownership issues, remarked that "the small landowner threatened 
with seizure, the squatter who sold his clothes to keep his rights of pre-
emption from falling into the hands of speculators, had trouble recog-
nizing one of their own kind in Lincoln."36 If anything, Lincoln saw his 
role as a lawyer less as a progressive crusader than as mediating facili-
tator who could "resolve disputes peacefully."37 
Lincoln was not oblivious to economic or social unfairness. How 
could he be, having been born poor himself? But "he submitted to 
adversity and injustice with as much real patience as any Man I Ever 
knew," wrote Illinois governor Richard J. Oglesby, "because he had an 
abiding belief that all would yet come out right or that the right would 
appear and Justice finally be awarded to him."38 What inclined Lincoln 
to such confidence in the ultimate swing of justice was its claim on 
human nature and the unobstructed arc it enjoyed in an environment of 
governmental minimalism- and the rule of law, not the mandating of 
fairness. To create law and to walk away from further intervention in 
people's lives was to invent a zone of openness and opportunity for self-
transformation. Under a government of laws, "it is best for all to leave 
each man free to acquire property as fast as he can." And the best evi-
dence of how this worked was Lincoln's own history. "Twenty-five 
35 Mark E, Steiner, An Honest Calling: The Law Practice of Abraham Lincoln 
(DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2006), 100. 
36 Olivier Fraysse, Lincoln Land, and Labor, 1809-60, trans. Sylvia Neely (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1994), 78. 
37 Brian Dirck, Lincoln the Lawyer (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 164. 
38 R.J. Oglesby (January 5, 1866), in Herndon's Informants, 152. 
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years ago, I was a hired laborer," he said in 1859. But "the hired labor-
er of yesterday, labors on his own account today; and will hire others to 
labor for him tomorrow." Of course, Lincoln could not (and did not) 
deny that there were hired men who never became more than hired 
men. But that was not because some titanic injustice deliberately hand-
icapped them. "If any continue through life in the condition of the hired 
laborer, it is not the fault of the system, but because of either a depend-
ent nature which prefers it, or improvidence, folly, or singular misfor-
tune."39 The role of law - whether in the legislature or the courts - was 
to ensure that every man would "have the chance - and I believe a black 
man is entitled to it - in which he can better his condition.. . . That is 
the true system . . . and so it may go on and on in one ceaseless round 
so long as man exists on the face of the earth!"40 That was why he 
would, in 1861, describe the Civil War as "a People's contest" - not a 
popular uprising of the masses, but a battle to stave off the imposition 
of a slave-based aristocracy on America and preserve a system that 
encouraged economic and social mobility, a 
struggle for maintaining in the world, that form, and substance of 
a government, whose leading object is, to elevate the condition of 
men - to lift artificial weights from all shoulders - to clear the 
paths of laudable pursuit for all - to afford all, an unfettered start, 
and a fair chance, in the race of life. . . . This is the leading object 
of the government for whose existence we contend.41 
In no sense did he imagine that justice was simply a question of who 
had the power and who could manipulate the laws. Justice had not 
arrived because the sword had been crossed by the pitchfork, or 
because monarchy had been replaced by the commune. Justice was 
what happened when laws were popularly adopted, and the rule of law 
even-handedly enforced. That will not guarantee the same results for 
everyone. "Some will get wealthy" and will "accumulate capital," then 
39 "Address before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Society, Milwaukee, Wisconsin" 
(September 30, 1859), in C.W, 3:478^179; John Charming Briggs, Lincoln's 
Speeches Reconsidered (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 234. 
40 "Speech at New Haven, Connecticut" (March 6, 1860), in C W, 4:24-25. 
41 "Message to Congress in Special Session" (July 4, 1861), in C.W., 4:438. 
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"to use it to save themselves from actual labor and hire other people to 
labor for them."42 In the case of those who did not, the solution was not 
a policy of spread-the-wealth or soak-the-rich by interposing the hand 
of power. If justice really is a matter of achieving both satisfaction and 
harmony, it will not come from 
a war upon property, or the owners of property. Property is the 
fruit of labor - property is desirable - is a positive good in the 
world. That some should be rich, shows that others may become 
rich, and hence is just encouragement to industry and enterprize. 
Let not him who is houseless pull down the house of another; but 
let him labor diligently and build one for himself, thus by example 
assuring that his own shall be safe from violence when built.43 
Not every complaint about fairness is really a protest against injustice; 
and not every complaint about injustice can be satisfied without run-
ning some risk that its real motive' is the will-to-power. "Inequality is 
certainly never to be embraced for its own sake," Lincoln admitted. But 
that was no sanction for "the pernicious principle . . . that no one shall 
have any, for fear all shall not have some." Those who appealed to gov-
ernmental power as the catch-all source of justice would find that gov-
ernments can develop a nasty appetite for power, especially if it can be 
disguised as the dispensing goddess of fairness.44 He warned the young 
Illinois state legislator Shelby Cullom in 1862 that 
there is this difference between dealing with the government and 
dealing between individuals. If you deal with an individual and he 
doesn't do right you can sue him in court and make him pay dam-
ages. But if you are dealing with the government you are helpless.45 
Even his decision to append the claim that the Emancipation 
Proclamation was an "act of justice" was a last-minute addition to a 
42 "Speech, at Cincinnati, Ohio" (September 17, 1859), in C.W, 3:459. 
43 "Reply to New York Workingmen's Democratic Republican Association" (March 
21, 1864), inC. W., 7:259-60. 
44 "Fragment on Government" [July 1, 1854?], in C.W, 2:221-222. 
45 Cullom (March 22, 1908), in Fehrenbacher, Recollected Words of Abraham 
Lincoln, 125. 
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document whose foundation was otherwise laid in a scrupulous, almost 
plodding, application of whatever could be construed as a legal exercise 
of presidential "war powers" under the president's constitutional rubric 
of "commander-in-chief of the army and navy in time of war or rebel-
lion." 
Ironically, even after using those governmental "war powers" to 
hand down "an act of justice" in the Proclamation, Lincoln actually 
grew less confident about the ability of government to achieve justice. 
He worried that immediate emancipation would prove inferior to "some 
practical system by which the two races could gradually live themselves 
out of their old relation to each other, and both come out better prepared 
for the new."46 And he worried that that the federal courts might strike 
down the Proclamation as unconstitutional. "I think it is valid in law, 
and will be so held by the courts," he wrote General Stephen Hurlbut 
in 1863, but in any case "I think I shall not retract or repudiate it." Two 
years later, he was less sure: at the Hampton Roads Conference in 
February, 1865, he admitted to Alexander H. Stephens that he did not 
know how "the Courts would decide it . . . and [he] could give no 
answer." 
His own opinion was that as the proclamation was a war measure 
and would have effect only from its being an exercise of the war 
power, as soon as the war ceased, it would.be inoperative for the 
future. It would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come 
under its operation while it was in active exercise. This was his 
individual opinion, but the Courts might decide the other way and 
hold that it effectually-emancipated all the slaves in the States to 
which it applied at the time. So far as he was concerned, he should 
leave it to the Courts to decide. He never would change or modify 
the terms of the Proclamation in the slightest particular.47 
Strikingly, his recourse in that case was not to the accumulation of more 
power, but a determination to settle the end of slavery by statute - which 
46 "To Nathaniel P. Banks" (August 5, 1863), in C.W, 6:365. 
47 Stephens, A Constitutional View of the Late War Between the States (Philadelphia: 
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in this case took the form of the Thirteenth Amendment. And he warned 
radical Republicans not to be over-confident that Union victory in the 
war was a sign that justice had become a Northern political property. "If 
we shall suppose that American Slavery is one of those offences which, 
in the providence of God, must needs come," Lincoln said in his Second 
Inaugural Address, then it has come because no nation, being human, 
can avoid such offenses. But let it be clear that this particular offense 
was shared by both North as well as South, since both had colluded his-
torically in fastening the blight of slavery on the republic. Now, through 
the instrument of "this terrible war," the blight is being removed; but the 
judgment, like the collusion, comes down on "both North and South . . 
. as the woe due to those by whom the offence came." This may rasp 
unpleasantly on the sensibilities of the over-righteous among the anti-
slavery radicals; but who can gainsay the justice of the Almighty? "Shall 
we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the 
believers in a Living God always ascribe to Him?" Much as Lincoln 
hoped that "this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away," yet 
there was still justice in the punishment it assessed: 
Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the 
bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be 
sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash, shall be 
paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand 
years ago, so still it must be said "the judgments of the Lord, are 
true and righteous altogether."48 
We yield haltingly to the justice of God, because yielding to it means 
that we have admitted at last that ultimately justice is not our property, 
and that we have finally met the perfect balance of law and power. But, 
whether we wanted to yield or not, Lincoln believed "that He will com-
pel us to do right in order that He may do these things, not so much 
because we desire them as that they accord with His plans of dealing 
with this nation, in the midst of which He means to establish justice."49 
48 "Second Inaugural Address" (March 4, 1865), in C.W, 8:332. 
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So if, by means of the war, "God now wills the removal of a great 
wrong, and wills also that we of the North as well as you of the South, 
shall pay fairly for our complicity in that wrong," then "impartial his-
tory will find therein new cause to attest and revere the justice and 
goodness of God."50 Justice would indeed concern everyone, whether 
they liked its shape or not; but no one would own it as their property, to 
play with as the cat's-paw of power. Over two hundred years after 
Lincoln's birth, it might be well to remind ourselves that the real enemy 
of both fairness and justice is not the weakness of our satisfactions or 
an unwillingness to bear shared sacrifice, but the dark temptation of 
power, luring us to the abyss with our own desires. 
50 "To Albert G. Hodges" (April 4, 1864), in C. W, 7:282. 
